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Studies of infants' and adults' social cognition frequently use geometric-shape 
agents such as coloured squares and circles, but the influence of agent visual-form on 
social cognition has been little investigated. Here, although adults gave accurate explicit 
descriptions of interactions between geometric-shape aggressors and victims, implicit 
association tests for dominance and valence did not detect tendencies to encode the 
shapes’ social attributes on an implicit level. With regard to valence, the lack of any 
systematic implicit associations precludes conclusive interpretations. With regard to 
dominance, participants implicitly associated a yellow square as more dominant than a 
blue circle, even when the true relationship was the reverse of this and was correctly 
explicitly described by participants. Therefore, although explicit dominance judgements 
were strongly influenced by observed behaviour, implicit dominance associations were 
more clearly influenced by preconceived associations between visual form and social 
characteristics. This study represents a cautionary tale for those conducting experiments 
using geometric-shape agents. 
Keywords: Geometric-shape agents, visual form, social judgement, intention 
attribution, implicit association test  





Animated geometric-shape agents with no morphology in common with humans or 
other animals are readily interpreted as intentional social agents if they move like social 
agents do (Abell et al., 2000; Barrett et al., 2005; Gao et al., 2009; Heberlein and 
Adolphs, 2004; Scholl and Tremoulet, 2000). In one classic example a featureless 
triangle was described as “dominating, power-loving, [and] possessive” due to its self-
propelled movements in interaction with other geometric shapes (Heider and Simmel, 
1944). From birth, such biological motion is processed differently to mechanical 
motion, prompting the conclusion that evolved specialised mechanisms form the basis 
for such processing (Frankenhuis and Barrett, 2013; Gelman, 1990; Simion et al., 2013). 
Because adults readily interpret moving geometric shapes as agents, such shapes 
have been used in a number of recent studies of adults’ social cognition in which 
geometric-shape processing in itself was not the focus, simply because geometric 
shapes are convenient for producing uncomplicated social stimuli. For example, 
geometric-shape agents have been used to investigate cultural differences in theory of 
mind (Koelkebeck et al., 2011) and processing of norm violations and punishment 
(Eriksson et al., 2016). Geometric shape agents have also been used to study the 
perception of social events like chasing (Gao et al., 2010; Gao et al., 2009) and the roles 
of spatial and temporal cues in judgements of intentionality (Scholl and Tremoulet, 
2000; Takahashi and Watanabe, 2015). However adults’ affective valence responses and 
other implicit responses to geometric shapes have been less studied (Kuhlmeier, 2013). 
It is relevant to note that manipulation of human stimuli to make them look less human 
diminishes affective valence responses (Mould et al., 2012). It is therefore plausible that 
although adults’ explicit reports concerning geometric-shape agents are similar to their 
reports for real agents, their implicit associations may be divergent. This might present a 
methodological concern for the use of geometric-shape agents. This study therefore 
investigates adults’ implicit valence associations and implicit social intention 
ascriptions for geometric-shape agents, and compares these implicit responses to 
explicit reports. 
Because infants also readily interpret moving geometric shapes as agents, and 
because such simple stimuli can be easily controlled with respect to their superficial 




perceptual properties, geometric shapes have also been widely used in studies of 
infants’ social cognition. Not only have they been used to study basic questions of 
infants’ understanding of animacy and goal-directed movement (Biro et al., 2007; 
Gergely and Csibra, 2003; Luo et al., 2009; Premack, 1990), but they have also been 
widely used to investigate infants’ judgements and expectations of agents’ social 
actions, including value judgements (e.g. Kuhlmeier et al., 2003; Lyons and Cheries, 
2017; Meristo and Surian, 2013; Premack and Premack, 1997; Tatone et al., 2015; 
Thomsen et al., 2011). In one example of such a study, six- and ten-month-olds viewed 
two geometric-shape agents who either helped or hindered a third such agent in 
achieving its goal of climbing a hill (Gredebäck et al., 2015; Hamlin, 2015; Hamlin et 
al., 2007). Given the choice of reaching for the agents, infants preferred the helper over 
the hinderer and even over a neutral agent. Infants themselves help a geometric-shape 
agent who is unable to reach its goal (Kenward and Gredeback, 2013). Such studies are 
taken as indicating that infants have a preference for agents who behave prosocially 
(Hamlin, 2013; Kanakogi et al., 2017).  
In a further such study, ten-month-olds viewed two interacting geometric-shape 
agents, one of whom behaved aggressively toward the other by chasing, knocking, and 
squashing it (Kanakogi et al., 2013). Given the choice of reaching for the agents, infants 
preferred the victim over the aggressor, and even preferred the victim over a neutral 
agent, meaning the results cannot be explained only by a negative evaluation of an 
antisocial act. The authors concluded that this preference for a victim is best explained 
by a rudimentary form of sympathy for victims of antisocial acts, because empathic 
detection of others’ suffering leads to sympathetic approach behaviour (de Waal, 2008; 
2012; Fujisawa et al., 2006; Kanakogi et al., 2017). 
Studies of infants have therefore established not only that they interpret the 
actions of geometric shapes in terms of goals, but also that they evaluate these goals in 
terms of valence, leading to approach or avoidance. When it comes to adults, however, 
we are not aware of a published study which examines approach or avoidance of 
geometric-shape agents, although there is at least one study demonstrating adults can 
make explicit value judgements concerning such shapes (Eriksson et al., 2016). 




A priori study goals 
The original goal of this study was to investigate adults’ attributions of 
behavioural intention and valence to geometric-shape agents, the associations between 
attributed intention and valence, and the associations between implicit and explicit 
attributions. It is currently unclear how closely coupled intention attribution 
mechanisms are to valence attribution mechanisms in situations in which observers are 
aware of the unreality of the situation. While it is obviously the case that fictional drama 
can elicit powerful positive or negative emotional reactions, it is also plausible that 
unreal social scenarios such as those featuring geometric shapes may be more effective 
at eliciting intention attribution than explicit preference judgements. Affective responses 
need not arise from the understanding of the consequences of social actions – these 
processes are independent and dissociable, both behaviourally and neurologically 
(Gonzalez-Liencres et al., 2013; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). In fact, a pilot study 
(Kanakogi et al., 2012) which tested adults’ reactions to stimuli which in infants had 
elicited preference for a victim and avoidance of an aggressor (Kanakogi et al., 2013) 
suggested that adults did not share this spontaneous preference, although they explicitly 
attributed relevant intentions to the interacting shapes. Possibly, explicit preferences in 
adults were lacking because of the explicit knowledge of the unreality of the situation. 
However, explicit knowledge of unreality might not suppress any implicit preferences 
which may be present.  
We utilised stimuli developed to test infants’ social preferences between a victim 
and a dominant aggressor, because these stimuli are already known to generate 
preferences (in infants, Kanakogi et al., 2013) and explicit attributions of intentionality 
(in adults, Kanakogi et al., 2012). We followed the pilot study (Kanakogi et al., 2012) in 
testing explicit preference in a way as close as possible to the original infant study, and 
by testing explicit intention attribution by simply asking what participants thought of 
the shapes. We also asked participants to explicitly justify their preferences. For implicit 
associations, we used two implicit association tests (IAT) (Greenwald et al., 1998). One 
test uses a valence (good / bad) concept pair for testing implicit preference, and one uses 
a dominance / subordinance concept pair for testing behavioural intention attribution 
(because explicit responses in the pilot study frequently fell into this category). 




The IAT has shown good reliability and correlation with explicit scales and 
behaviours in many contexts (De Houwer et al., 2009; Greenwald et al., 2009; Nosek et 
al., 2007), although the issue of implicit/explicit attitude correlation is not without 
controversy (Oswald et al., 2013). It measures the relative associations of two target 
concepts (here the victim and the aggressor) with two attribute concepts (here good and 
bad or dominant and subordinant in the two IATs). It utilises the fact that reaction-times 
for quickly sorting different exemplars using the same key-press are faster when the 
exemplars are more closely implicitly associated. Here, the IAT could reveal for 
example that the victim is associated as more positive than the aggressor if participants 
react more quickly when sorting victims and positive words using the same computer 
key (congruent condition) than when sorting aggressors and positive words using the 
same key (incongruent condition). While the valence IAT is intended simply to explore 
potential implicit valence associations (see below for predictions), the dominance IAT 
was further intended as a manipulation check concerning the stimuli. If adult 
participants view the agent interactions as clearly reflecting aggressive dominance, as 
they are intended to and as pilot data suggested, then the dominant aggressor should be 
implicitly associated with dominance. 
In line with the pilot study (Kanakogi et al., 2012), we predicted that participants 
would implicitly and explicitly correctly attribute aggressive dominance to geometric-
shape agents, but that this would not necessarily lead to systematic explicit preference 
against such agents, due to knowledge of the unreality of the situation (in contrast to 
infants, Kanakogi et al., 2013). However, according to our hypothesis that this 
knowledge might not influence implicit valence judgements, we predicted that the 
implicit measures might reveal preference for the victim over the aggressor. This 
prediction is in line with the idea that infant behaviour sometimes reflects implicit 
processes which develop early but show continuity into adulthood because they are 
highly functional (Spelke and Kinzler, 2007). Further, although we do not predict strong 
systematic explicit preferences, because implicit preferences can unconsciously 
influence explicit preferences (Greenwald et al., 2009; Nosek et al., 2007), we predicted 
that there might be a correlation between the two. 




Further, a number of personality traits would be expected to modulate preference 
for a victim over an aggressor, so finding relations between these traits and implicit or 
explicit preference would provide validation of these preference measures. We 
hypothesised that lower social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994), greater 
empathy, and lower aggression might correlate with increased preference for the victim, 
and we therefore measured these by questionnaire. 
Post-hoc study goals 
Although we counter-balanced the forms of the victim and aggressor (blue circle 
versus yellow square), exploratory data examination indicated that visual form had 
strong effects on IAT results. Although this was not originally intended to be the study 
focus, we therefore also systematically examined whether visual form affects implicit 
and explicit preference and intention attribution. Previous studies have demonstrated 
valence associations with specific (non-agent) abstract shapes, with more curved and 
less angular objects having more positive valence (Bar and Neta, 2006; Larson et al., 
2012). However, although those results suggest that visual form could be important for 
the processing of geometric-shape agents, we are not aware of any study which has 
focussed on this issue. Although this issue was not the original focus of this study, 
because of unpredicted results indicating that effects of visual form were important in 
our data, discussion focuses on this issue. 
METHOD 
Participants 
 One hundred and thirty eight students (57 men; Mage = 24, SDage = 5) 
participated, with 25 Japanese participants recruited in Kyoto (part of the unpublished 
pilot study, Kanakogi et al., 2012), 21 Swedes in Stockholm and 92 Swedes in Uppsala. 
Of these participants, all were assessed using explicit measures, but a subset of 64 (all 
from Uppsala; 23 men; Mage = 24, SDage = 5) completed an IAT and personality 
questionnaire, with half randomly assigned to complete the Dominance IAT and the 
other half the Valence IAT. The data were collected in two waves, with Japanese data 
and Swedish data without IAT collected before the IAT was designed. No participants 




were excluded from analysis. Sample sizes (and therefore data collection stopping rules) 
were determined by practical considerations, chiefly the amount of data collectable 
within the course of a Swedish undergraduate dissertation project. Local and 
international (Declaration of Helsinki, American Psychological Association) ethical 
guidelines were followed, including approval by the Uppsala Regional Ethical Review 
Committee, and participants gave written informed consent. 
Materials 
 Familiarisation stimuli showed interactions between a blue ball and a yellow 
cube within a static green frame displayed on computer. Familiarisation sequences 
consisted of two alternating 20 second clips, in which the aggressor chased, knocked, 
and finally crushed the victim against the frame (the two clips differed only in the exact 
movement paths taken by the agents). Participants not taking the IAT and questionnaire 
saw the exact same familiarisation sequence as previously displayed to infants, with 
three of each clip variant presented for a total of six clip presentations, and brief 
attention grabbers (rotating cartoon animal faces with sound effects) between each clip 
(see Kanakogi et al., 2013 for further details of familiarisation stimuli - a video clip can 
be viewed at 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0065292#s6). The 
familiarisation sequences used in the IAT were composed of the same two clips, with 
two of each variant for a total of four, without attention grabbers. Fewer clips were used 
per sequence because the sequence was displayed more than once (see below). Physical 
replicas of the agents were used for the preference trials, which were the same objects as 
used previously (Kanakogi et al., 2013), measuring 6.5cm across. Aggressor and victim 
identity were counterbalanced (blue circle or yellow square; shape and colour were not 
separately counterbalanced). 
 The IAT was administered in the laboratory using OpenSesame 0.27.4, which 
has good performance with respect to latency (Mathôt et al., 2012). Stimuli were sorted 
with the Z and M computer keys. The IAT target stimuli consisted of pictures of the ball 
or cube within the green frame, with four variants of each with the agents in different 
locations in the frame. The attribute stimuli were Swedish words (translated here), 
positioned centrally, with eight words for each attribute. Valence words were from 




standard IAT lists, but with words specific to social interaction, such as Love, replaced; 
good – Wonderful, Happiness, Good, Pleasure, Paradise, Fantastic, Excellent, Pleasant; 
bad – Horrible, Terrible, Unpleasant, Death, Disease, Catastrophe, Awful, Bad. 
Dominance and subordinance word lists were constructed for the present task; 
dominance – Power, Strength, Ruler, Victory, Dominance, Advantage, Boss, Superior; 
subordinance – Surrender, Weakness, Defeat, Victim, Loser, Slave, Oppressed, Inferior. 
The IAT operated as follows: target sorting practice 1 (agents only, 32 trials); 
test block 1 (64 trials, 32 each for agents and attribute words); target sorting practice 2 
(agents only, 32 trials, sorting keys reversed from practice 1); test 2 (64 trials, 32 each 
of agents and attribute words, agent sorting keys still reversed but attribute sorting keys 
not reversed). 
Before every practice and test block a four-clip familiarisation sequence was 
displayed. Before test block 1 participants had therefore seen 8 clips establishing the 
agent’s roles (160 seconds) and before test block 2 participants had seen 16 clips (320 
seconds). Although a number of studies have demonstrated that the IAT can measure 
associations created during an experimental session (De Houwer et al., 2007; Han et al., 
2010; Han et al., 2006), the IAT has most commonly been used to test associations that 
existed prior to the experimental session and are therefore possibly stronger. These 
interspersed familiarisation sequences were therefore intended to maximise the strength 
of participants’ implicit associations for the agents during the test. This is also why we 
omit training on the attribute word sorting, which could have diluted the salience of the 
agents’ roles. The IAT is standard apart from these modifications. 
The questionnaire consisted of 49 Likert items from three instruments: the full 
Social Dominance Orientation instrument (Pratto et al., 1994); the Aggression 
Questionnaire – Revised Short Version (Ågren and Prochazka, 2001; Bryant and Smith, 
2001); and the subscales Empathic Concern, Perspective Taking, and Fantasy from the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Cliffordson, 2002; Davis, 1996). 





Participants not taking the IAT and questionnaire were shown the familiarisation 
sequence and then immediately shown the two physical replica objects, with the 
experimenter saying “Which do you choose? Go on gut-feeling”. (This wording was 
chosen because the original pilot study, which comprised the Japanese sample, aimed to 
maximise comparability between infant and adult methods, although this was not 
important here.) The choice was immediately noted, and after the choice, the 
experimenter asked the participant on what basis they made their choice, and then asked 
them to describe their impression of each agent and the relationship between them, 
writing down the answers verbatim. Participants taking the IAT and questionnaire 
underwent exactly the same procedure immediately after taking the IAT, except that 
two instead of six clips were shown in the familiarisation sequence immediately prior to 
choice because the clips had been displayed so many times during the IAT. 
 The following variables were counterbalanced: aggressor/victim identity, initial 
agent and IAT sorting key pairings, IAT block order (congruent/incongruent), agent 
presentation side in physical choice, and whether the questionnaire was completed 
before or after the IAT and physical choice. Trial order within blocks was randomised. 
Coding and analysis 
Agent choice justifications were coded from written notes according to the 
following categories: (1) strong, active, dominant; (2) weak, gentle, nice, pitiable; (3) 
aesthetic, (4) other, or (5) don’t know. The first two categories were scored if the stated 
words or close synonyms were used; aesthetic was scored if the agents’ shape, colour, 
or texture was referred to; other was scored for any other reason except don’t know. 
Although not a necessary consequence of this scheme, it was the case that all explicitly 
social justifications fell into categories 1 or 2, not 4 (other). 
Agent and interaction descriptions were scored from notes for whether either 
were ascribed the following three increasingly specific (mutually inclusive) properties: 
social (any explicitly social language), socially asymmetric (teasing/teased, 




strong/weak, hunter/hunted, or synonyms), and dominance related (strong/weak, 
hunter/hunted, or synonyms). 
For each individual an IAT D score was calculated according to the improved 
standard recommended algorithm (Greenwald et al., 2003), the key steps of which are 
subtracting the mean reaction time in the congruent block (valence IAT: victim paired 
with positive; dominance IAT: victim paired with subordinance) from the mean reaction 
time for the incongruent block, and dividing by the pooled standard deviation, with the 
reaction times for incorrect trials replaced with 600 ms plus the mean for that block. 
Our primary predictions (see introduction) were that explicit and implicit 
measures would or would not reveal group-level tendencies to identify the agents as 
more or less dominant or positively valenced. Our primary analyses are therefore 
comprised of descriptive estimates (with confidence intervals) of group tendencies to 
explicitly or implicitly identify agents as more or less dominant or positively valenced. 
RESULTS 
Preliminary analyses found no effects of age or culture on any dependent 
variables (details omitted for brevity, all p-values > .1). 
Explicit agent choice, choice justification, and agent description 
Overall, there was no significant bias towards choosing either agent, with 54% 
of participants, 95% CI [46%, 62%], choosing the victim, p = .349, sign test. A 
significant majority of participants chose the blue sphere rather than the yellow cube, 
59%, 95% CI [51%, 67%], p = .033, sign test. The agents or their interaction were 
described as social by 99% of participants, as socially asymmetric by 96% of 
participants, and as dominance related by 86% of participants. No participant gave a 
description of the agents or their actions in which the roles were incorrectly reversed. 
Justifications for choice of agent are presented in Table 1. Personality variables had the 
expected pattern of correlations (for example between aggression and social dominance 
orientation), establishing some validity for these measures in our sample, but showed no 
correlations with agent choice (Table 2). 





Agent choice justifications (percentage participants), by agent choice. 






Aesthetic Other Don’t 
know 
Aggressor 57 0 40 30 2 
Victim 7 41 39 32 3 
Row totals are greater than 100% because more than one justification was possible. 
Table 2. 
Correlation coefficients for personality, agent choice, agent choice justification, and 
IAT D-score variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Social dominance 
orientation            
2. Aggression  .47***           
3. Fantasy -.02  .23          
4. Empathic concern -.44*** -.18  .15         
5. Perspective taking -.11 -.18  .16  .33**        
6. Explicit agent 
choice: victim -.12  .06  .13 -.07 -.17       
7. Agent choice 
justification: strong  .15  .08  .07 -.15  .10 -.55***      
8. Agent choice 
justification: weak -.14 -.08  .16  .16 -.04  .49*** -.35***     
9. Agent choice 
justification: aesthetic -.06 -.05 -.08 -.03  .21 -.01 -.26** -.40    
10. IAT D: dominance 
(aggressor) -.05  .03  .00  .31  .00  .16 -.15  .25 -.06   
11. IAT D: dominance 
(yellow square)  .30 -.03 -.08 -.03 -.30  .27 -.41*  .10  .12  .28  
12. IAT D: valence  .06  .04 -.02 -.19 -.13  .21 -.27  .09 -.05 - - 
Notes. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Correlations are Pearson’s r except 
for those involving variables 6, 7, 8, and 9 which are point biserial correlations as these 
variables are binary. N = 138, except N = 64 for those involving personality variables (1 
to 5) and N = 32 for those involving IAT D variables (10 to 12). IAT D dominance 
(yellow square) is the post-hoc variable showing the extent to which the yellow square 
is associated with dominance (see main text). 




Implicit associations between the agents and concepts of dominance and valence 
In the dominance IAT, a positive D score indicates faster reactions when the 
aggressor rather than the victim was paired with dominance words, indicating a stronger 
association between the aggressor and the concept of dominance. There was no group 
level tendency towards a positive D score, M = .04, SD = .42, which is not significantly 
greater than 0, t(31) = .64, p = .527, Cohen’s d = .09, 95% CI for d [-.27, .45]. However, 
dominance D was strongly affected by the identity of the aggressor, with the yellow 
cube more strongly associated with dominance, irrespective of which agent was the 
actual aggressor (Fig. 1). This was confirmed by reversing the sign of the dominance D 
score for participants for whom the blue sphere was the aggressor, yielding a D for 
which positive scores meant faster reactions when the yellow cube was paired with 
dominance words. This D score was significantly positive, M = .26, SD = .33, t(31) = 
4.55, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .80, 95% CI for d [.44, 1.17]. The majority of participants, 
75%, 95% CI [57%, 89%], had a D score consistent with associating the yellow cube 
more strongly with dominance, p = .007, sign test.  
      
Fig. 1. Dominance IAT D-scores, by aggressor identity. Positive D scores imply 
an association between the aggressor and the concept of dominance. Error bars show 
95% CIs. 




In the valence IAT, a positive D score indicates faster reactions when the victim 
rather than the aggressor was paired with positive words, indicating a tendency to 
implicitly associate the victim as more positive. There was no significant group level 
tendency towards a positive D score, M = .04, SD = .52, which is not significantly 
greater than 0, t(31) = .38, p = .705, Cohen’s d = .07, 95% CI for d [-.29, .43]. To 
investigate whether the explicitly preferred agent was implicitly associated as more 
positive, the sign of the valence D was reversed for those who chose the aggressor, 
yielding a D for which positive scores meant faster reactions when the chosen agent was 
paired with positive words. There was no significant group level tendency for this D to 
be positive, M = .11, SD = .51, t(31) = 1.23, p = .230, d = .22, 95% CI for d [-.14, .58]. 
To investigate whether the blue sphere was implicitly associated as more positive, the 
sign of the valence D was reversed for participants for whom the blue sphere was the 
aggressor. There was no significant group level tendency for this D to be positive, M = 
.12, SD = .51, t(31) = 1.34, p = .191, d = .24, 95% CI for d [-.12, .60].  
Although D scores showed almost no significant correlations with other 
variables (Table 2), the D score indicating a tendency to associate the yellow square 
with dominance correlated negatively with the tendency to justify agent choice by 
describing an agent as strong, active, or dominant. This result was confirmed by 
comparing the relevant D scores between those who did (M = .35, SD = .34) or did not 
(M = .05, SD = .18) invoke this justification, t(27) = 3.24, p = .003. 
DISCUSSION 
In line with previous studies, the vast majority of adults here attributed social 
traits to geometric shapes, describing their movements with reference to human-like 
motives. Almost all participants had an accurate explicit memory of the social actions of 
the agents (and descriptions did not vary with personality or culture). Despite this, the 
dominance IAT did not appear to reflect this knowledge. No effect was detected, 
although the effect size confidence interval (upper bound .45) indicates the plausibility 
of a small undetected effect. On the other hand, three-quarters of participants had IAT 
scores indicating that they implicitly associated a yellow cube as more dominant than a 
blue sphere, irrespective of their explicit description of the actual relationship. We had 
not predicted such a strong result, but the effect size confidence interval (lower bound 




.44) indicates that the effect is not spurious. Despite the modest sample size of 32, this 
confidence interval and the associated p-value (p < .001) strongly indicate the effect 
would prove reliable. Furthermore, even if an undetected effect of agent social 
behaviour does exist, the confidence intervals indicate that this undetected effect is 
smaller than the effect of agent visual form. The most important part of our discussion 
therefore focuses on this unexpected effect (below) but first we discuss our valence 
results in more detail. 
There was no detected relation between participants’ explicit agent choices and 
their valence IAT scores (although effect size confidence intervals indicate the 
plausibility of a medium undetected effect). Furthermore, for the valence IAT there 
were no detected systematic associations at all – not for behaviour or for visual form. 
Explicit preference between aggressor and victim also showed no systematic pattern. 
Roughly half the participants gave preference justifications appropriately referencing 
the agents’ social intentions. However, we note that aesthetic justifications were also 
common, and that choice justifications are frequently post-hoc rationalisations which do 
not bear any relation to the true motivation for the choice (Hall et al., 2012; Johansson 
et al., 2005). We also note that the only systematic preference was based on visual form 
– the blue ball was weakly but significantly preferred, which is consistent with reports 
of a general preference for blue (Hurlbert and Ling, 2007; Palmer and Schloss, 2010). 
Together, these data do not provide strong evidence that intention attribution was 
clearly motivating implicit or explicit preference. A further observation is relevant: if 
choices were truly related to the agents’ ascribed intentions, one might expect choice to 
be predicted by the traits empathy, aggression, or social dominance orientation, whereas 
post-hoc rationalisation predicts no such relations. No such relations were observed. 
We note that there might be methodological reasons why the valence IAT as 
implemented was not optimal. The approach was motivated by the well-known 
association between approach and positive valence, together with an assumption that 
sympathy for victims is associated with approach. These associations do not, however, 
necessarily imply a simple link between sympathy for victims and positive valence – 
sympathy for a victim is also associated with negative feelings. We refrain from further 




discussion of the valence results as these issues together with the lack of systematic 
implicit or explicit preference present a challenge to clear interpretation. 
With respect to valence, we were therefore unsuccessful in achieving our a priori 
study goal of comparing implicit and explicit responses. However, the unexpected but 
very clear effect of agent visual form on implicit dominance association means post-hoc 
discussion of this issue is warranted. As far as we know abstract shapes have not 
previously been found to be associated with specific social traits due to their visual 
form. It has previously been demonstrated that objects with sharper corners can be more 
aversive, however, and it has been argued that this is because such shapes are 
experienced as more threatening (Bar and Neta, 2006; Larson et al., 2012). This 
argument fits well with and receives support from the current IAT results and with the 
finding of a preference for the ball in the choice test. Further, given that in both the 
natural and the artificial worlds yellow is associated with danger (Stevens and Ruxton, 
2012), it is plausible that colour may have contributed to the effect. There is therefore 
evidence lending plausibility to putative effects of both colour and shape in generating 
implicit dominance attribution, and it is not possible to establish their relative influence 
– we suggest that the strength of the effect may be due to a combination of both factors. 
Although it is possible that some similarity not directly related to dominance caused the 
association between visual form and the dominance words (IAT recoding; Meissner and 
Rothermund, 2013), other similarities are lacking in this case, rendering a non-
dominance-based account implausible. Valence might have been a candidate, but there 
were no detected valence associations. 
Although lacking precedent with respect to geometric-shape agents, it is in 
hindsight not puzzling that shape and/or colour produced dominance associations, given 
that shapes and colours can have socially relevant associations (Bar and Neta, 2006; 
Larson et al., 2012; Stevens and Ruxton, 2012). Importantly, we also note that several 
previous studies have shown that even infants form expectations about geometric-shape 
agents based on their visual forms (Lyons and Cheries, 2017; Thomsen et al., 2011). 
What does require explanation, however, is why objects should so strongly elicit such 
implicit associations in adults despite explicit descriptions of the agents entirely at odds 
with these associations. 




The standard IAT method has been demonstrated in many different contexts to 
demonstrate a good fit between implicit and explicit attitudes (Greenwald et al., 2009; 
Nosek et al., 2007), although this issue is not uncontroversial (Oswald et al., 2013). This 
study joins some others in demonstrating less straightforward results (De Houwer et al., 
2009) – factors which have no bearing on participant’s explicit attitudes are known to 
sometimes influence IAT results (Han et al., 2006; Olson and Fazio, 2004). Previously, 
however, when factors unrelated to personal explicit attitudes have influenced implicit 
attitudes, the strongest influence on IAT results was nevertheless personal explicit 
judgement (Han et al., 2006). Here, however, participants’ explicit attributions of 
dominance to the objects had no detectable effects on their dominance IAT 
performance, and any undetected effects can confidently be concluded to be weaker 
than the strong implicit associations between abstract visual form and dominance. This 
apparent disconnection between explicit and implicit associations requires further work 
to explain, and we now raise issues which should be addressed in future research. 
Firstly, we consider a methodological issue: the majority of previous IAT studies 
measure attitudes which are well-established and therefore well-consolidated into 
memory (Greenwald et al., 2009). It is possible that here, the comparatively recently 
formed intention representations were not yet consolidated into automatic associations 
capable of reliably influencing IAT performance (Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2006; 
Han et al., 2006). While this explanation cannot be ruled out, we do not favour it, 
because a number of previous studies, some using very similar methods, have indicated 
that attitudes created in the experimental session do influence IAT performance (De 
Houwer et al., 2007; Han et al., 2010; Han et al., 2006). A second methodological issue 
is that some aspects of the IAT method used here was slightly non-standard. It is 
possible that these modifications may have diminished the sensitivity of the IAT to 
detect any associations. However, this possibility appears very unlikely given that the 
dominance IAT did clearly detect associations with agent visual form. 
Given that the reason that explicit intention representations did not influence 
IAT score is arguably not methodological, it is plausible that the apparent explicit / 
implicit disconnection reflects something real about intention attribution to geometric-
shape agents. We suggest that although biological intention detection mechanisms 




readily process agents that observers know are in fact not really agents, the knowledge 
of the unreality may cause the detected intentions not to be encoded more deeply, in a 
way which could affect implicit associations. The suggestion that the social actions of 
geometric-shape agents do not lead to deeply encoded intention representations is 
consistent with the results of some studies of reactions to human social scenes. In these 
studies images are manipulated (e.g. by slight blurring) so that although the scene is 
recognisable, the subjects no longer appear realistically human. Participants report less 
strongly valenced emotional responses to such stimuli (Mould et al., 2012), and brain 
activation in regions associated with social and emotional processing is diminished 
(Mar et al., 2007). 
Although implicit dominance associations were not related to the way in which 
participants described the agents when specifically questioned about their behaviour, 
when participants were asked for a more open-ended response justifying their choice of 
agent, a curious relation with the dominance IAT was found. Those who more strongly 
associated the yellow square with dominance were less likely to invoke an agent 
description of strong, active, or dominant as justifying their choice. Although the 
specific mechanism of this effect cannot yet be determined, the result suggests that 
implicitly activated dominance concepts may have interfered somehow with the 
tendency to explicitly invoke dominance. This result suggests that although the implicit 
dominance associations based on visual form cannot over-ride explicit knowledge that 
they conflict with, they can nevertheless affect spontaneous behaviour in more subtle 
ways. We note also that this correlation between implicit and explicit behaviour 
provides further evidence that implicit association of visual form with dominance is not 
an irrelevant artefact. 
We now summarise our conclusions and their implications. We draw no strong 
conclusions with regards to valence, because there were few clear systematic group-
level results for implicit or explicit measures. With regard to dominance, however, we 
found that although adults explicitly accurately described the social relationship 
between the agents, their implicit associations more strongly reflected apparently 
preconceived notions connecting visual form to social attributes. We cannot completely 




rule out methodological explanations for why implicit associations relevant to the 
shapes’ intentions were not detected, although we view this as unlikely. 
We finally note that these conclusions are specific to the current stimulus set, 
and may not generalise to other stimuli. We acknowledge that adults can make value 
judgements about unreal agents, whether in the form of geometric shapes (Eriksson et 
al., 2016), schematic cartoons (Buon et al., 2013), or described hypothetically (Bruers 
and Braeckman, 2014). To our knowledge, this study does not raise validity issues for 
specific previous studies using geometric-shape agents. However, we do suggest that 
the current results imply that studies using geometric-shape agents should be treated 
with a degree of caution pending further study, especially if adult implicit measures are 
to be used. Moral judgements of situations known to be unreal do differ from those 
concerning equivalent real situations (FeldmanHall et al., 2012). The disconnection 
between explicit and implicit associations suggested here could be one reason for this. If 
nothing else, the clear result that implicit associations between geometric-shape agents 
and social traits are strongly influenced by their visual form should be taken into 
account in the design of future studies. 
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